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The Precautionary Premium and the Risk-Downside Risk Tradeoff 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 This paper shows that the precautionary premium embodies a tradeoff between risk and downside 
risk. It is the size of a mean-preserving spread for which the strength of aversion to risk just offsets the 
strength of aversion to downside risk. Using this result, decreasing absolute prudence can be interpreted 
as meaning that the amount of exposure to risk (as measured by a spread) for which aversion to risk just 
offsets aversion to downside risk decreases as wealth increases. This happens when an increase in wealth 
causes a smaller percentage change in absolute downside risk aversion than in absolute risk aversion.  
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1. Introduction 
 A fundamental concept in the Arrow-Pratt theory of risk aversion is the risk premium π, defined 
by the equation u(w-π) = Eu(w+ z~ ), where u(w) is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function for 
wealth w and z~  is an actuarially neutral random variable. A mathematically parallel concept, the 
precautionary premium γ, was introduced by Kimball (1990), who defined it by the equation u’(w-γ) = 
Eu’(w+ z~ ). Unlike the risk premium whose preference meaning follows directly from its defining 
equation, the precautionary premium has been interpreted in the context of a decision model. Specifically, 
Kimball has shown that γ can be interpreted as the sure reduction in future income that has the same effect 
on current saving as does the addition of a zero-mean risk on future income. Parallel to the hypothesis of 
decreasing absolute risk aversion, Kimball formulated the hypothesis that the precautionary premium 
decreases in wealth, a hypothesis increasingly used in the literature and is equivalent to decreasing 
absolute prudence (DAP).1 
 In this paper, we present an interpretation of the precautionary premium directly based on its 
defining equation. Our interpretation is in terms of preferences between simple pairs of lotteries. Consider 
a basic lottery that offers w and w+∆w with equal likelihood. For a choice of subtracting s from one of the 
two states, all risk-averse individuals prefer to subtract s from the good state. For a choice of adding a 
zero-mean risk z~  to one of the two states, all downside risk-averse individuals prefer to add z~  to the 
good state.2 Now consider the choice of subtracting s from one state and adding z~  to the other state. How 
will an individual who is both risk averse and downside risk averse choose? For a given z~ , when s is 
small, the individual would choose to add z~  to the good state and subtract s from the bad state. The 
intuition behind this is that the individual’s exposure to risk is small and therefore aversion to risk is 
dominated by aversion to downside risk. The reverse happens when s is large. Our main result shows that 
there exists a unique s* such that aversion to risk just offsets aversion to downside risk. We show that this 
                                                           
1 See Gollier (2001).  
2 Menezes et al (1980) showed that u”’ > 0 is equivalent to aversion to downside risk. 
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s* is equal to γ. Thus, the precautionary premium is the size of a mean-preserving spread such that 
aversion to risk exactly offsets aversion to downside risk.3  
 In the literature, an individual is said to be prudent if adding a zero-mean risk to his future income 
raises his optimal saving.4 Equivalently, an individual is prudent if and only if u’ is convex. Hence, 
prudence is equivalent to aversion to downside risk. However, decreasing absolute prudence is related to 
but conceptually distinct from decreasing downside risk aversion. We show that for small risks, u”’/u’ is a 
measure of absolute downside risk aversion. As is well-known, –u”/u’ is a measure of absolute risk 
aversion and –u”’/u” is a measure of absolute prudence. From our main result, we derive a 
reinterpretation for DAP in terms of aversion to risk and aversion to downside risk. We show that a 
necessary and sufficient condition for DAP is that an increase in wealth causes a smaller proportional 
change in absolute downside risk aversion than in absolute risk aversion. 
 In recent years a sizable literature has found the need for including downside risk (usually in 
terms of skewness) as well as risk (variance) in the empirical analysis of a variety of economic 
phenomena (Bekaert and Harvey, 1997; Bekaert et al, 1998; Pownall and Koedijk, 1999).5 Tradeoffs 
between mean, variance and skewness have been considered in horse race betting behavior (Golec and 
Tamarkin, 1998), and in the purchase of state lotteries in the U.S. (Garrett and Sobel, 1999). Harvey and 
Siddique (2000) have found that “Systematic skewness is economically important and commands a risk 
premium, on average, of 3.60 percent per year.” Despite these studies, there has been no general 
characterization of the tradeoff between risk and downside risk. In this paper we provide such a 
characterization and show that the precautionary premium embodies a tradeoff between risk and 
downside risk. 
                                                           
3 As will be seen from the risk pair (r1, r2) defined in the following section, s is a measure of a mean-preserving 
spread. 
4 See Gollier (2001, pp. 236-237). 
5 Pownall and Koedijk state “Using data on Asian equity markets, we observe that during period of financial 
turmoil, deviations from the mean-variance framework become more severe, resulting in periods with additional 
downside risk to investor. Current risk management techniques failing to take this additional downside risk into 
account will underestimate the true Value-at-Risk with greater severity during periods of financial turmoil.” (p. 853) 
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 Section 2 contains our analysis of the risk-downside risk tradeoff and its relationship to the 
precautionary premium. Section 3 gives a reinterpretation of DAP. Section 4 briefly reviews the literature. 
In it, we show how our interpretation of the precautionary premium is related to Kimball’s analysis of 
precautionary saving. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2. The Precautionary Premium and the Risk-Downside Risk Tradeoff 
 In this section we describe three classes of risk pairs. The first class of risk pairs represents an 
increase in risk.  The second class represents an increase in downside risk. The third class has the property 
that the strength of preference between any pair of risks in this class can be decomposed into the 
difference between the strength of aversion to risk pairs in the first class and the strength of aversion to 
downside risk pairs in the second class. We show that for any individual who is both risk averse and 
downside risk averse, there exists a unique pair of risks in the third class for which the individual is 
indifferent between the risks in this pair. That is, for this risk pair, aversion to downside risk just offsets 
aversion to risk. For this risk pair, the change in risk as measured by the size of a mean-preserving spread 
exactly offsets the change in downside risk. This mean-preserving spread is shown to be the precautionary 
premium defined in the literature. 
 Let w and ∆w denote wealth and increment in wealth, respectively. Consider the class R of risk 
pairs (r1, r2), where s ≥ 0:  
 
           w-s              w 
     ½         ½ 
 
             r1 =                  r2 =     
 
   ½        ½  
 
         w+∆w           w+∆w-s 
 
This pair has the characteristic that r1 can be obtained from r2 by a mean-preserving spread. Since s is the 
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distance by which each point of the support of r2 is moved outward to obtain r1, s serves as a measure of 
the size of the spread. We call the difference between the distributions of r1 and r2 an s-spread. Since r1 
has more risk than r2, all risk averters (u” < 0) prefer r2 to r1. Following Friedman and Savage (1948),6 
 SR = Eu(r2) - Eu(r1)         (1) 
is the disutility attached to the s-spread and represents the strength of aversion to the increase in risk.7  
 Let z~  be an actuarially neutral random variable (i.e., E z~  = 0) with distribution function F(z) on 
support [-a, b], a > 0 and b > 0. Consider the class D of risk pairs (d1, d2):   
 
           w+ z~               w 
 
     ½         ½ 
 
             d1 =                  d2 =     
 
   ½        ½  
 
         w+∆w           w+∆w+ z~  
 
This pair has the characteristic that d1 can be obtained from d2 by a mean-variance-preserving downward 
transfer of dispersion (actuarially neutral noise z~  is shifted from w+∆w to w). Hence, d1 has more 
downside risk than d2.8 All downside risk averters (u”’ > 0) prefer d2 to d1. Let 9  
 SD = Eu(d2) - Eu(d1).         (2) 
SD is the disutility attached to the increase in downside risk and represents the strength of downside risk 
aversion. 
                                                           
6 SR = 1/2 ∫ ∫
−
∆
++−
0
s
w
0
dtdx)]xtw("u[ is positive for all risk averters (u” < 0).  
7 SR = Eu(r2) - Eu(r1) = [Eu(r2)-u( r )] – [Eu(r1)-u( r )], where r  is the mean value of r1 and r2. Following Friedman 
and Savage (1948), each of the bracketed terms is a utility-based measure of risk aversion since they represent the 
strength of an individual’s preference for the sure option r  over the risky alternative r1 or r2. It follows that the 
difference (i.e., R) represents the strength of the individual’s preference for r2 over r1.  
8 Menezes et al (1980) provided the characterization of downside risk in terms of integral conditions.  
9 SD = 1/2 ∫ ∫ ∫
−
∆
++−
b
a
w
0
z
0
)z(dydtdF)ytw('"u)yz(  is positive for downside risk averters (u”’ > 0).  
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 Consider now the class L of lotteries (L1(s), L2(s)) defined by 10 
 
           w-s               w+ z~  
 
     ½         ½ 
 
        L1(s) =              L2(s) =     
 
   ½        ½  
 
         w+∆w+ z~            w+∆w-s  
 
 The strength of preference for pairs in L can be decomposed into the difference between the 
strength of preference for pairs in R and the strength of preferences for pairs in D.11 This follows 
immediately from   
 Eu(L2) - Eu(L1)  = [Eu(r2) - Eu(r1)] - [Eu(d2) - Eu(d1)] = SR - SD.    (3) 
From (3),  
 Eu(L2) - Eu(L1) > (<, =) 0   iff   Eu(r2) - Eu(r1) > (<, =) Eu(d2) - Eu(d1).   (4) 
For a small s (close to zero), L1 is preferred to L2 so that the strength of downside risk aversion exceeds 
the strength of risk aversion; the reverse happens for a large s. As s increases, SR increases while SD 
remains unchanged.12 That is, the strength of risk aversion increases as s increases and the strength of 
aversion to downside risk remains unchanged as s increases. This leads to the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1. If u” < 0 and u”’ > 0 then there exists a unique value of s for which Eu(L1) = Eu(L2), or 
equivalently the strength of risk aversion is equal to the strength of downside risk aversion (SR = SD).  
  
                                                           
10 For any s ≥ 0, the lotteries L1 and L2 have the same mean, and the variance of L1 is greater than or equal to that of 
L2 since Var(L1)–Var(L2) = (∆w)s ≥ 0. 
11 Let Fα denote the distribution function for any lottery. It can be shown that  
 1LF  - 2LF  = [ 1rF  - 2rF ] + [ 2dF  - 1dF ].  
It follows that the comparative structure of L1 and L2 is a mixture of risk and downside risk.  
12 0dt)]stw("u[
2
1
s
SR w
0
>−+−=
∂
∂
∫
∆
.  Since 0dt)stw('"u
2
1
s
SR w
02
2
>−+=
∂
∂
∫
∆
, SR is convex in s. 
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 Let s* be the value of s for which SR = SD. We now show how s* is related to the precautionary 
premium γ, that was introduced by Kimball (1990) and is defined by the equation u’(w - γ) = Eu’(w+ z~ ). 
Rearranging the equation SR = SD gives 
 u(w+∆w-s*) - u(w-s*) = Eu(w+∆w+ z~ ) - Eu(w+ z~ ).     (5)  
For an infinitesimal increase in wealth (∆w → 0), (5) becomes 
 u’(w – s*) = Eu’(w+ z~ ).         (6) 
Hence, s* is equal to the precautionary premium γ. Proposition 1 provides a new interpretation for the 
precautionary premium. That is, the precautionary premium is the change in risk as measured by the size 
of a mean-preserving spread that just offsets a given change in downside risk.  
 Figure 1 graphically depicts the precautionary premium. In it, the curves SR and SD are drawn 
from a fixed level of wealth w. The precautionary premium γ is the value of s where the curves SR and 
SD intersect. For s < γ, SR lies below SD, indicating that the strength of downside risk aversion exceeds 
that of risk aversion. The reverse is true for s > γ.13  
<Insert Figure 1 about here> 
 
3. A Reinterpretation of DAP 
 The absolute prudence function p(w) = -u”’(w)/u”(w) was first introduced by Kimball (1990), 
who advanced the hypothesis that absolute prudence decreases in wealth (DAP). This hypothesis is 
equivalent to the statement that the precautionary premium γ decreases in wealth and has been generally 
accepted in the literature. In this section we show how DAP can be reinterpreted in terms of the behavior 
of risk aversion and downside risk aversion. 
 We begin by defining the premiums for risk pairs in D and in R. Let Πα denote the Arrow-Pratt 
risk premium for lottery α and define 
                                                           
13 For s < γ, u’(w-s) < Eu’(w+ z~ ); for s > γ, u’(w-s) > Eu’(w+ z~ ). 
 
 
 8
 πr = 21 rr Π−Π  and πd = 21 dd Π−Π .       (7)  
πr is the difference between the cash equivalent of r2 and the cash equivalent of r1 and πd is the difference 
between the cash equivalent of d2 and the cash equivalent of d1.14 Since r1 is obtained from r2 by a mean-
preserving spread, πr is a dollar measure of aversion to the increase in risk. Similarly, as d1 is obtained 
from d2 by a downside transfer of dispersion, πd is a dollar measure of aversion to the increased downside 
risk.15  
 For small risk z~ , Kimball (1990) showed that (6) implies 
 γ = (σ2/2)[
)w("u
)w('"u
− ] = (σ2/2)p(w).        (8) 
For small risk z~  and small increment in wealth ∆w, by (7)  
 πr = (∆w)(s/2)[ )w('u
)w("u
− ],         (9) 
 πd = (∆w)(σ2/4)[ )w('u
)w('"u ].         (10) 
It follows from (8) to (10) that πr = πd at s = γ.  
 Denote absolute risk aversion by a(w) = -u”(w)/u’(w) and define absolute downside risk aversion 
as d(w) = u”’(w)/u’(w). (9) indicates that for small risks the behavior of d(w) controls the behavior of the 
downside risk premium πd . By definition, 
 p(w) = d(w)/a(w).         (11) 
From (11),  
 p’(w) < (>, =) 0    iff     d’(w)/d(w) < (>, =) a’(w)/a(w).  
 To highlight this result, we state it as Proposition 2. 
                                                           
14 The cash equivalent of a lottery is the sure amount of money that makes the individual indifferent between this 
amount and the lottery. It is equal to the difference between the expected value of a lottery and the Arrow-Pratt risk 
premium. 
15 The risk premium πr is in keeping with the literature when considering a pair of non-degenerate risks. Since an 
increase in downside risk involves two non-degenerate risks, it cannot be defined in terms of indifference between a 
risk and a surety. Our definition of the downside risk premium πd is analogous to that of πr.  
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Proposition 2. Absolute prudence is decreasing (increasing) in wealth if and only if an increase in wealth 
causes a smaller (greater) percentage change in absolute downside risk aversion than in absolute risk 
aversion.  
 
 The DAP hypothesis has been generally accepted in the literature. Proposition 2 indicates that the 
intuition behind this hypothesis is that risk aversion dominates downside risk aversion as wealth 
increases.  
 
4. Literature 
 Precautionary saving refers to saving that arises from uncertainty about future income. Irving 
Fisher (1930) attributed such saving to the need “to lay up for a rainy day”, arguing that “the greater the 
risk of rainy days in the future, the greater is the impulse to provide for them at the expense of the 
present.” (pp. 77-78) Fisher’s insight was formalized by contributions by Leland (1968) and Sandmo 
(1970), who analyzed precautionary saving in a two-period expected utility framework. They showed that 
precautionary saving is positive (negative) according as the individual is a downside risk averter 
(preferrer).  
 Kimball (1990) extended the analysis of precautionary saving by considering the intensity of the 
precautionary saving motive, as measured by the precautionary premium. He defined this premium as the 
sure reduction in future income that has the same effect on saving as the addition of a zero-mean risk to 
future income. We can illustrate precautionary saving and its relationship to the precautionary premium in 
a simple two-period model. This enables us to show how the risk-downside risk tradeoff underlies the 
intensity of the precautionary saving motive. 
 Let kc be the optimal saving under certainty: 
 Maxk  v(w1-k)+u(w2+k),        (12) 
where w1 and w2 are income in period 1 and period 2, respectively, v is the period-one utility function. 
Let ku be the optimal saving under income risk when period-two income is w2+ z~ :    
 Maxk  v(w1-k)+Eu(w2+ z~ +k).        (13) 
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Finally, let k*(C) denote the optimal saving when second period income is w2-C: 
 Maxk  v(w1-k)+u(w2-C+k),        (14) 
where C is the reduction in period two income. The precautionary saving is given by ku-kc. It is positive 
under downside risk aversion (u”’ > 0). The precautionary premium γ is the value of C for which k* = ku. 
From the first order conditions for (13) and (14), this happens when u’(w-γ) = Eu’(w+ z~ ), where w = 
w2+k*.  
 Figure 2 illustrates precautionary saving and the precautionary premium in terms of the 
relationship between the solutions to the problems (12)-(14).  Sc, Su and S* are the optimal points for (12), 
(13) and (14), respectively, where S* corresponds to C = γ.16 In the diagram, precautionary saving is the 
horizontal distance between Sc and Su while the precautionary premium γ is the vertical distance between 
Su and S*.   
<Insert Figure 2 about here> 
 We now show the sense in which the risk-downside risk tradeoff underlies the intensity of the 
precautionary saving motive. In Figure 2, the curve connecting Sc and S* is the income-consumption 
curve (ICC) under certainty resulting from changes in period-two income. Suppose C < γ. Then the 
optimal solution to (14) is at some point on ICC that is above S*. Hence, saving under income risk (ku) is 
greater than saving (k*) under certainty with second period income w2-C. We next show that this is 
equivalent to the individual’s preference between two lotteries that involve a tradeoff between risk and 
downside risk and for which the individual’s aversion to risk is dominated by aversion to downside risk.  
 By the first-order conditions for (13) and (14) and that ku > k*,  
 )z~kw('Eu)kw('v *2
*
1 +++−−  > 0,  
 )kCw('u)kw('v *2
*
1 +−+−−  = 0.  
Hence,  
                                                           
16 The introduction of a zero-mean risk z~  causes indifference curves to shift upward due to risk aversion and to 
rotate counter-clockwise due to downside risk aversion. Hence, Su lies to the left of Sc on the budget line: c1+c2 = 
w1+w2.  See Menezes and Auten (1978). 
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 )z~kw('Eu *2 ++  > )kCw('u
*
2 +− .  
This holds if and only if J1 is preferred to J2 for small ∆w > 0, where  
 
           w2+k*-C               w2+k*+ z~  
 
     ½         ½ 
 
 J1 =      J2 = 
 
   ½        ½  
 
         w2+k*+∆w+ z~           w2+k*+∆w-C  
 
 
Matching w with w2+k* and s with C, J1 and J2 respectively become L1 and L2 defined in Section 2. 
Hence, from the analysis in Section 2, aversion to downside risk dominates aversion to risk. The intuition 
underlying this is that the exposure to risk as determined by the size of the spread (C) is lower than the 
exposure to risk when the size of the spread is γ. Since downside risk is unaffected by the size of the 
spread, exposure to downside risk dominates that of risk. The reverse happens when C > γ. Finally, when 
C = γ, aversion to risk just offsets aversion to downside risk. 
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
  This paper shows that the precautionary premium involves a tradeoff between risk and downside 
risk. We show that u”’/u’ is a measure of absolute downside risk aversion, and decreasing absolute 
downside risk aversion is related to but distinct from DAP. DAP can be interpreted as saying that the 
amount of exposure to risk (as measured by a spread) for which aversion to risk just offsets aversion to 
downside risk decreases as wealth increases. This happens when an increase in wealth causes a smaller 
percentage change in absolute downside risk aversion than in absolute risk aversion.  
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